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bstract
We investigate enterprise level factors affecting access to formal credit for small enterprises in India by employing a probit sample selection
odel. Our results indicate that enterprise size, owners’ education level, being registered under an agency and being involved in diversified activities
re positively associated with access to formal credit. However, the ownership of land that can be used as collateral is negatively associated with
he likelihood of receiving formal credit. This may be due to an obsolete land administration system resulting in high transaction costs of land as
ollateral. These results provide some insights into the factors to improve credit constraints for small enterprises in India. 2015 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
EL classiﬁcation: G2; L60; O2
e sele
f
c
c
i
l
m
p
t
s
s
a
n
c
Kohli (1997) and Eastwood and Kohli (1999) are the only
existing studies examining the determinants of bank loans for
small enterprises in India employing panel data over the periodeywords: Small enterprises; Credit constraints; Priority sector lending; Sampl
.  Introduction
Small enterprises contribute enormously to the socioeco-
omic development of India. The sector accounts for more than
5% of the industrial units and contributes 45% of the manu-
acturing output and 40% of the export (Ministry of MSME,
014). Therefore, small enterprises play a crucial role in creat-
ng employment and helping in the industrialisation of rural and
ackward areas.
The promotion of small enterprises in India dates back to the
ate 1950s. Since then, various preferential schemes have been
onducted to improve credit supply, marketing, and skill and
echnology for this sector. As many studies, such as those of
eck and Demirgüc¸-Kunt (2006) and IFC (2012), demonstrate,
f the many challenges impeding the growth of small enterprises,
nadequate access to formal credit is one of the key bottlenecks∗ Corresponding author at: Faculty of Economics, Musashi University, 1-26-1
oyotama-kami, Nerima, Tokyo 176-8534, Japan. Tel.: +81 3 5984 3825;
ax: +81 3 3991 1198.
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or small enterprises. India is no exception. In spite of favourable
redit policies, many small enterprises in India remain credit
onstrained.
In this paper, we examine the enterprise level factors affect-
ng access to formal credit for small enterprises in India, using
arge-scale unit level data. We employ a probit sample selection
odel to examine the factors associated with small enterprises’
robability of access to formal credit.
There are many studies on access to formal credit for agricul-
ure and rural households in India.1 In spite of being an important
ector in the Indian economy, however, credit availability for
mall enterprises has not been studied adequately. This study is
n attempt to fill the gap. Our empirical study also presents some
uances of the Indian context compared to the earlier studies on
redit constraints for small enterprises.1 As several examples among many, Binswanger et al. (1993), Burgess and
ande (2005), Burgess et al. (2005), Basu (2005), Basu and Srivastava (2005),
amath et al. (2010), Shah et al. (2007) and Cole (2009).
ll rights reserved.
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965–78. They found that the firm size, age, and collateral of
nterprises have a positive and significant impact on the prob-
bility of receiving bank loans. Using the natural experiments
difference-in-difference) approach, Banerjee and Duflo (2014)
xamine the impact of policy change in priority sector lend-
ng on productivity of small enterprises in India for the period
996–2002.2 These studies are, however, restricted to a limited
ample of small enterprises that had received priority sector
dvances from commercial banks.
The data we employ in this paper are from a national level
ample survey of more than 80,000 manufacturing enterprises
onducted over the period 2005–06. In line with the existing lit-
rature on credit constraints for small enterprises, we find that
ore organised enterprises have a higher likelihood of access to
ormal credit. Enterprises with female owners and enterprises
ngaged in capital intensive industries are more likely to face
redit constraints. However, the ownership of land that can be
sed as collateral is negatively associated with the likelihood of
eceiving formal credit. Production under subcontracting rela-
ions with other enterprises is not significantly associated with
eceiving formal credit.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an
verview of small enterprises in India and presents a brief
escription of credit policies for this sector. In Section 3, we
resent the literature on credit constraints for small enterprises,
ollowed by Section 4 where we present our data, model speci-
cation and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
.  Small  enterprises  in  India
.1.  The  rationale  for  promotion  of  small  enterprises
Support schemes for small enterprises form an important
evelopment strategy in many economies. Since the late 1950s,
he Indian government has supported small enterprises to gener-
te employment and to promote balanced regional development.
arious preferential schemes such as credit assistance, tax
xemption, purchase preference by the government agencies
nd preferential access to raw materials have been provided for
mall enterprises. The most important scheme, however, was the
3eservation policy. The schemes of protection and promotion of
mall enterprises were designed on the presupposition that small
nterprises cannot obtain adequate credit due to asymmetric
2 They found that bank lending to small enterprises and their revenues
ncreased for enterprises that became eligible for the priority sector because
f upward revision of definition for small enterprises in 1998, and then those
ecreased for enterprises that lost eligibility as a result of reversal of the def-
nition in 2000, compared to small enterprises that were already getting bank
redit before 1998.
3 The reservation policy was introduced in 1967 when a list of items that
ould be reserved for production exclusively for small enterprises was created.
ith the introduction of the policy, the production capacity of large enterprises
hat were producing the ‘reserved items’ was frozen. In addition, no new large
nterprise was allowed to produce them. At its height, there were 872 items in
he reserved list (Ministry of Industry, 1997). With the introduction of policies
f trade liberalisation, the reserved list was gradually reduced. Eventually the
ist was completely removed in April 2015.
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nformation and that they cannot enjoy scale economies in mate-
ial purchases and marketing. Since the economic liberalisation
egan in 1991, the environment surrounding small enterprises
as changed. On the one hand, small enterprises have faced
evere competition from imported products. On the other hand,
mall enterprises have been increasingly expected to act as a
rowth engine due to their flexible and innovative nature.
The definition of small enterprises varies across countries
nd sectors. In India, micro and small manufacturing enterprises
ave been defined in terms of the value of investment in plants
nd machinery since 1966, and the investment ceiling in plants
nd machinery has been revised from time to time. As per the
icro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED)
ct 2006, micro and small manufacturing enterprises are defined
n terms of enterprises whose investment in plants and machinery
oes not exceed Rs. 50 million.4 These enterprises produce over
000 products and account for approximately 45% of India’s
otal manufacturing output (Ministry of MSME, 2014). In this
aper, we confine our analysis to micro and small manufacturing
nterprises (“small enterprises” hereafter). This is partly because
ending to medium enterprises is not included for priority sec-
or lending described below and partly because manufacturing
nterprises have more nature and potential for creating jobs.
.2.  Credit  policies  for  small  enterprises  in  India
The Government of India and Reserve Bank of India
RBI) have been instrumental in devising a multi-agency
pproach to extend financial services to small enterprises. These
nclude commercial banks, co-operative banks and development
nancial institutions. Commercial banks with their extensive
etworks of branches accounted for 91.2% and co-operative
anks accounted for 6.5% of the total formal credit for small
nterprises, and development financial institutions such as the
mall Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and State
inancial Corporation (SFC) accounted for 2.3% of the total
ormal credit as of March 2008 (SIDBI, 2010).
Commercial banks have been the most important source of
ormal credit to small enterprises. In particular, public sector
anks have been playing a dominant role in disbursing credit to
mall enterprises since the nationalisation of major commercial
anks in 1969 and 1980. In 1972, small enterprises and agricul-
ure were identified as a priority sector, which might not receive
imely and adequate credit in the absence of this special dis-
ensation. Although there was initially no specific target fixed
4 What had been known as Small Scale Industries (SSI) prior to 2006 has been
enamed ‘Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME)’ with the enactment
f MSMED Act in 2006. Under the Act, there was a three-fold paradigm shift:
rst, the globally well-known concept of ‘enterprises’ has replaced the term
industries’; second, the definitional scope has been expanded to medium enter-
rises; and third, rapidly growing service enterprises such as retail trade, hotels
nd restaurants have been added to the ambit. Thus, the entire non-agricultural
ector of the economy has been brought under the concept of the MSME sector
ubject to the revised criteria prescribed for defining micro, small and medium
nterprises separately for manufacturing and services sectors. For more details,
ee Nikaido et al. (2012) regarding the SSI sector and the MSMED Act 2006.
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Fig. 1. Advances to the priority sector by public sector banks (% to net bank
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ource: RBI, Report on trend and progress of banking in India, various issues.
n respect of priority sector lending, in 1974 commercial banks
ere asked to direct 33.3% of their credit to the priority sector
y March 1979. Subsequently, commercial banks were asked to
irect 40% of their credit to the priority sector by March 1985. A
ub-target for agriculture was also fixed at 18% by March 1990,
hile a specific sub-target was not fixed for small enterprises
RBI, 2009). Over the years, private sector indigenous banks
nd foreign banks have also been asked to get involved in the
riority sector lending.
In Fig. 1, we present some data on priority sector advances by
ublic sector banks, which are the dominant provider of priority
ector lending. As seen in Fig. 1, the share of priority sector
dvances in net bank credit increased from 14.6% in 1969 to
4.6% in 1989. The share of small enterprises’ advances in net
ank credit also increased from 8.5% in 1969 to 16.9% in 1989.
he setting of the target for the priority sector had a positive
mpact on the channelling of credit to hitherto neglected sections
n the pre-liberalisation era.
Since the financial sector reform began in the 1990s, the def-
nition and scope of the priority sector was expanded, although
he quantitative target for the sector has remained unchanged.
ew sections such as housing loans and micro credit have been
ntroduced, and ceiling limits on advances to education and
ousing loans have been raised, especially since the early 2000s.
ore affluent borrowers who are not considered to be among
he vulnerable were included in the priority sector because the
pward revision of the loan ceiling would not have been justi-
ed on the grounds of inflationary pressures. Such expansion
f the coverage of the priority sector seems to have adversely
ffected the credit availability of small enterprises. As Fig. 1
emonstrates, the share of small enterprises’ advances in net
ank credit by public sector banks has been decreasing since the
arly 2000s, while the share of others including housing loans
n net bank credit has been increasing.5
5 For foreign banks, a target of 32% for the priority sector and sub-targets of
2% for export and 10% for small enterprises were introduced after 1991, i.e., in
he post-liberalisation era. However, their presence in priority sector lending is
imited. The share of public sector banks in total small enterprises’ advances was
he highest, at 74.3%, followed by private sector banks with a share of 18.6%
nd foreign banks with a share of 7.0%, as of March 2009.
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In addition to the priority sector lending requirement, public
ector banks have been mandated to open at least one specialised
ranch for small enterprises in each district to ensure suffi-
ient credit flow for small enterprises. Public sector banks have
lso been asked to open specialised small enterprises’ branches
n identified clusters with a dominance of small enterprises to
nable entrepreneurs to have easy access to bank credit and equip
ank personnel with the requisite expertise since 2005.6
.  Factors  affecting  access  to  formal  credit  by  small
nterprises
In spite of the longstanding supply side credit policies, the
hare of credit flow to small enterprises appears to be dete-
iorating, as economic liberalisation proceeds. The cost and
vailability of credit is a major issue facing small enterprises in
ndia (Ministry of Finance, 2013). It may be interesting to con-
ider why lenders will not give loans to small enterprises and
nvestigate the demand side factors affecting access to formal
redit. To look into the factors that could affect small enterprises’
ccess to credit, we review the literature on credit constraints.
.1.  The  literature  on  credit  constraints  for  small
nterprises
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing may be an
quilibrium situation when there is imperfect information. This
s because information asymmetries exist between lenders and
orrowers in the ex-ante screening of projects (adverse selection)
nd ex-post monitoring of loan contracts (moral hazard). If a rise
n the interest rate to clear the market lowers average borrowers’
uality, lenders will choose to ration their credit.
Although credit rationing is not unique to small enterprises,
mall enterprises are more likely to face restrictions in the
redit market due to higher transaction costs of lending to small
nterprises. Transaction costs of lending to enterprises com-
rise administrative costs and default costs. Administrative costs
re those that are attributable to the processing, delivering, and
dministrating of loans. Default risk costs are those expenses
or provision for losses, loan guarantee fees paid, and actual bad
ebts (Saito and Villanueva, 1981).
Even if the administrative costs are constant regardless of
he loan size, the costs as a percentage of loan size decrease
s the loan size increases. Assuming that the size of a loan is
ositively correlated with the size of an enterprise, the per unit
ransaction costs of lending to a small enterprise are higher than
hose of lending to a large enterprise. However, in practice, the
efault costs and the administrative costs are not constant but
igher for small enterprises than those for large enterprises for
he following reasons.
It is well known that the provision of collateral may reduce the
roblems of information imperfection and cover losses through
6 Although RBI does not regularly disclose statistics on specialised branches
or small enterprises, the number of specialised branches operated by public
ector banks was 1220 as on March 2011.
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ganised manufacturing enterprises from the National Sample
Survey (NSS) conducted between July 2005 and June 2006
(NSS 62nd round).7 The unorganised enterprises covered by
7 The term “unorganised manufacturing” basically refers to all manufacturing
enterprises that are not included in the factory sector and public sector undertak-
ings. In India, the factory sector consists of enterprises employing ten or more
workers with the aid of power or twenty or more workers without the aid of6 Y. Nikaido et al. / Review of De
efault, but small enterprises do not own sufficient assets for
ollateral. If any, because pledged land or building is often of a
ersonal nature, some costs may be present in arranging and fore-
losing such collateral (Tendulkar and Bhavani, 1997). Reliance
n such personal assets may discourage a lender’s investment
Binks and Ennew, 1996). Lenders may also utilise financial
tatements and enterprises’ performance such as sales and pro-
ts to assess repayment prospects. However, small enterprises
n developing countries may not have complete financial state-
ents, and more time is therefore required to evaluate their
reditability. Earlier studies on Indian small enterprises have
ound that a large number of owners do not maintain formal
ccounts. Moreover, in a number of cases, there is no clear sep-
ration between the account of the owner’s household and that
f the enterprise (Pais, 2004; NCEUS, 2009). In addition, small
nterprises may show relatively more volatility in the face of
conomic slowdowns because they have less diversified products
Saito and Villanueva, 1981).
These factors taken together lead to the higher transaction
osts of lending to small enterprises. Saito and Villanueva
1981) estimate the real costs of lending to small enterprises
re approximately twice those of lending to large enterprises in
he Philippines.
In addition to the above hard information, some studies argue
hat lenders may utilise alternative soft information such as the
ge of an enterprise, the relationship with banks, past commu-
ication with contractors, and other sources of finance in the
ase of informationally opaque small enterprises (Petersen and
ajan, 1994; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Berger and Udell, 2006).
onditional on its past experience with the borrower, the lender
ow expects loans to be less risky. This could reduce the transac-
ion costs of lending. It is also possible that lenders could obtain
nformation on an enterprise’s ability to serve claims by observ-
ng its past interactions with contractors (Petersen and Rajan,
994).
There is some evidence that small enterprises that are linked
s suppliers to successful large enterprises usually succeed in
heir ventures in many economies. Odaka and Kiyokawa (2008)
nd Uchikawa (2011) find that small enterprises in the auto com-
onent industry acquire knowledge and technology spillovers
hrough continuing relationship with assemblers and large auto
omponent enterprises in India. Their finding may be under-
tandable because Japanese major assemblers and parts makers
ave entered into capital and technical tie-ups with Indian enter-
rises in the automobile industry, and therefore, the Japanese
ethod of supply-chain systems has penetrated. Considering
hese studies, it may be expected that if a small enterprise has a
ontractual relationship with a large enterprise, it may then face
ess credit constraints. However, NCEUS (2009) and Pais and
ahu (2011) find that in the case of small enterprises in India,
hile working under sub-contract with larger enterprises has
een increasing in recent years, enterprises working under con-
ract do not perform better than those not working under contract.
n other words, it may be concluded that on average, small enter-
rises working under contract may be driven to subcontracting
nder distress and eventually do not gain significantly from this
elationship. In addition, the relationship has been found to be
p
1
p
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xploitative with the issue of delayed payment. Thus, the effect
f small enterprises’ sub-contracting relationships with large
nterprises for availability of formal credit is not unambiguous
n the case of India.
.2.  Other  factors  affecting  access  to  formal  credit  in  India
Looking at other variables that could affect the credit avail-
bility of small enterprises in India, enterprises that register
nder an act/agency are likely to have better access to formal
redit as being registered in practical terms makes it easy to
ccess the government’s support schemes for small enterprises.
n addition, by the process of registration, the registered enter-
rises give their information to agencies and can therefore be
xpected to be more transparent than non-registered enterprises,
nd can hence be expected to have less information asymmetry.
hus, registration status should be positively associated with the
robability of access to formal credit.
Enterprises with more educated owners can be expected to
ave easier access to formal credit than enterprises with less
ducated owners. This is because less educated owners tend
o have more difficulty with application procedures and expect
o be rejected. In addition, educated owners are more likely to
ave managerial skills in finance, marketing production, and
nternational business that would lead to the enterprise’s growth
Kumar and Francisco, 2005). Further, the gender of the owner of
n enterprise may play some role in access to formal financing,
s the literature shows that female owners are more likely to be
nancially excluded.
As Rajan and Zingales (1998) note, banks may prefer enter-
rises of specific industries such as growing industries. Further,
nterprises engaged in capital-intensive industries with higher
redit needs for initial project scale and continuing investment
ay face relatively greater constraints (Kumar and Francisco,
005).
There may be regional effects because enterprises belonging
o more developed regions with a high density of bank branches
ill have easier access to banking services.
.  Empirical  analysis
.1.  Data  and  sample  selection
To investigate factors associated with credit availability for
ndia’s small enterprises, we employ the unit level data on unor-ower and are registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act
948. Those manufacturing enterprises registered under the Factories Act and
ublic sector enterprises taken together are called the “organised sector”, while
he remaining enterprises are called the “unorganised sector”.
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Table 1
Distribution of enterprises with and without credit demand.
Source of credits Enterprises
without credit
demand
(47.1%)
Enterprises with credit demand (52.9%) Total enterprises
(100%)
Constrained Unconstrained Sub-total
No credit 38,897 100.0% 33,618 87.3% 0 0.0% 33,618 77.1% 72,515 87.9%
Only informal credit 0 0.0% 1514 3.9% 1015 19.8% 2529 5.8% 2529 3.1%
Informal and formal 0 0.0% 410 1.1% 547 10.7% 957 2.2% 957 1.2%
Only formal credit 0 0.0% 2949 7.7% 3554 69.5% 6503 14.9% 6503 7.9%
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and are more likely to diversify their products. Furthermore,
the unconstrained enterprises are significantly more likely to
register under an act/agency and maintain an account in written
Table 2
Comparison of variable means between constrained enterprises and uncon-
strained enterprises.
Variables Constrained
enterprises
with credit
demand
Unconstrained
enterprises
with credit
demand
(N = 38,491) (N  = 5116)
Log Workers 0.734 1.760***
Land Fixed Assets Ratio 0.542 0.402***
Value Added Fixed Assets Ratio 0.375 0.124
Diversified Activities 0.056 0.099***
Account 0.114 0.530***
Contract Work 0.194 0.163***
Registration Status 0.226 0.721***
Illiterate 0.141 0.037***
Primary Edu 0.317 0.132***
Secondary Edu 0.460 0.428***
Higher Edu 0.082 0.403***
Female Owner 0.169 0.091***
Southern Region 0.150 0.374***
***otal 38,897 100.0% 38,491 100.0%
ource: Authors’ calculation based on NSS dataset.
he survey are those that employ less than 10 workers with the
id of power and less than 20 workers without the aid of power.
hough this definition does not directly correspond with the def-
nition of small enterprises based on the investment ceiling as
iscussed in Section 2, it is observed that 99.9% of the enter-
rises covered in the survey had plants and machinery worth less
han Rs. 50 million, conforming to the definition of small enter-
rises. We exclude the remaining few enterprises with more than
s. 50 million of investment in plants and machinery from our
nalysis. Thus, the enterprises we analyse are small not only in
erms of the number of workers but also in terms of the invest-
ent value in plants and machinery and thus, appropriate data
o analyse. We employ data of 82,504 small enterprises from
arious regions of India for our analysis.
It is essential to consider the issue of “sample selection bias”,
nless all small enterprises that are eligible for priority sector
ending have a demand for credit. Whether small enterprises can
eceive formal loans in the credit market depends on enterprises’
elf-selection, namely, whether small enterprises have a demand
or credit. Sample selection bias arises if unobservable factors
uch as an owner’s preference influence the selection process
nd the subsequent performance.
Following earlier studies such as Rand (2007) and Bigsten
t al. (2003), we identify small enterprises with credit demand
s those enterprises that either reported that they had a shortage
f capital or reported that they did not have a shortage of capital
ut received credit from a formal or informal source. We define
he former enterprises as “constrained enterprises” and the latter
nterprises as “unconstrained enterprises” in the credit market.
sing this definition, we can see in Table 1 that 52.9% of the total
2,504 small enterprises in the survey reported that they had a
emand for credit, while the remaining 47.1% reported that they
id not need credit.8 Within the enterprises with credit demand,
onstrained enterprises accounted for 88.3% and unconstrained
nterprises accounted for 11.7%. As in the case of constrained
nterprises, 87.3% of the small enterprises did not receive credit
8 We cannot indicate whether the distribution of a firm’s age affects its demand
or credit because the information on the firm’s age is not available in the survey.
hus, whether start-up costs and working capital for small enterprises are small
nough to use their savings is beyond the scope of the paper and requires further
nvestigation.
N
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N
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*
s6 100.0% 43,607 100.0% 82,504 100.0%
rom any source, although we cannot identify whether they were
enied credit or discouraged from applying for credit due to the
ear of being refused. Although some of the enterprises received
redit, regardless of the source, they borrowed less than they
esired.
Table 2 presents sub-sample means for variables between
onstrained enterprises and unconstrained enterprises.
ppendix Table A presents the definition of the variables that
e employ in our analysis. We find that the unconstrained
nterprises are larger firms in terms of the number of workersorthern Region 0.168 0.242
astern Region 0.258 0.073***
estern Region 0.102 0.203***
entral Region 0.196 0.093***
ortheastern Region 0.126 0.015***
ndusry G1 0.630 0.503***
ndustry G2 0.115 0.237***
ndstry G3 0.255 0.260
ource: Authors’ estimates based on NSS dataset.
** Indicates that the difference between the means is greater than zero at the
ignificance level of 1%.
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(
a demand for credit is found to be significantly and positively
associated with formalness of the enterprises (Wage Workers).
Further, the enterprises engaged in more capital intensive
10 For more details on the model, see Baum (2006) and Van de Ven and Van8 Y. Nikaido et al. / Review of De
orm. However, the constrained enterprises have a slightly
igher ratio of land to fixed assets and are more likely to work
nder sub-contract. The former finding regarding the land may
e due to the high transaction costs of using land as collateral
n India. India has a land deed registration system. Under this,
 deed only provides evidence of the transaction and says
othing about the validity of the ownership.9 In addition, many
nterprises tend to avoid registration because of the complicated
rocedures and higher level of stamp duties. Thus, lenders
ay evade giving loans to small enterprises because they have
o utilise their resources to investigate whether the ownership
s genuine. With regard to the latter finding, undertaking
ontract work with large enterprises may not indicate their
reditworthiness but indicate an arrangement driven by distress
n India.
Turing to owner related variables, the constrained enterprises
re more likely to have female owners and less educated owners.
he unconstrained enterprises are significantly more likely to
e located in the southern, northern and western regions, while
he constrained enterprises are more likely to be located in the
entral, eastern and northeastern regions.
Considering the result of the variable means comparison tests
n Table 2, we control the two groups within the enterprises
ith credit demand employing a dummy variable (Constrained
ummy).
.2.  Model  speciﬁcations
To examine the determinants of access to formal credit in the
ontext of India’s small enterprises, we employ a probit model
ith sample selection. This approach takes care of the sample
election bias discussed above. This is a two-stage estimation
rocess, provided by Heckman (1979) for linear models and
hen extended to a probit model for the first time by Van de
en and Van Pragg (1981). This model assumes that the main
utcome variable is observed only if a selection condition is met.
he model may be written as
∗
1j =  xjβ  +  ui latent equation
he latent variable y∗1j depends on factors xj, and the binary
utcome y1j = 1 arises when y∗1j >  0.
1j =  1(xjβ  +  u1j >  0) outcome equation (1)
However, the dependent variable y1j for the observation j  is
bserved only if2j =  1(zjβ  +  u2j >  0) selection equation (2)
9 The obsolete land administration system in India dates back to British times
nd has been hardly modified. Many developed and developing economies have
ade the transformation from a deed to title registration system, under which the
egister serves as primary evidence of ownership. For more details, see World
ank (2007).
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here
u1∼N(0,  1)
u2∼N(0,  1)
corr(u1,  u2) =  ρ
hen ρ  /=  0, a standard probit technique applied to the Eq. (1)
ields biased results. The probit with a sample selection model
rovides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates for all
f the parameters.10
In our model specification, we observe whether a small
nterprise receives formal loans in the credit market (y1j = 1 or
1j = 0) only if the enterprise has a demand for credit (y2j = 1).
n the selection Eq. (2), we assume whether a small enterprise’s
emand for credit is affected by industry specific characteris-
ics in which it engages (Industry dummies) and the formalness
f an enterprise in the sense that it hires workers other than
amily members (Wage Workers dummy). In the outcome Eq.
1), the dependent variable (Formal Credit) takes a value 1 if
n enterprise has received formal credit and 0 otherwise. The
SS survey specifically collects data on whether an enterprise
eceived any formal credit in a five-year reference period. Formal
redit includes credit from commercial banks and co-operative
anks, development financial institutions and other Government
gencies.11 We seek to examine the probability that an enter-
rise receives formal credit as a function of several explanatory
ariables based on the literature on credit constraints. A list
f explanatory variables and their construction are given in
ppendix Table A.
The data we employ here are from a survey based on strati-
ed and multi-stage sampling design. Following the standard
ractice of estimating a weighted regression when the sur-
ey data are not from a simple random sample, we estimate
 weighted probit regression.12 We use the subsample-wise
eights given by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO),
hich conducted the survey.13
.3.  Results  of  the  estimation
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 3. The
ald test of independent equations rejects the null hypothesis
H0: ρ  = 0), validating our model specification.
In the selection Eq. (2), the probability that enterprises haveragg (1981).
11 Although quantitative data of credit outstanding are available in the survey,
e judged the data to be inappropriate for analysis as credit outstanding does
ot indicate the amount of credit received. Credit outstanding only indicates the
esidual amount of credit to be repaid to the creditor on the date of the survey. If
ome enterprises had obtained credit but already repaid the lenders by the date
f the survey, then their credit outstanding would be zero.
12 For more on issues on use of weighted regression for survey based data, see
ameron and Trivedi (2010).
13 For more details, see NSSO (2007).
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Table 3
The result of the probit with sample selection.
Coefficients Robust
standard errors
Outcome: Formal Credit
Constrained −0.871*** 0.076
Log Workers 0.134*** 0.023
Land Fixed Assets Ratio −0.058** 0.027
Value Added Fixed Assets
Ratio
−0.003 0.002
Regstration Status 0.240*** 0.042
Account 0.009 0.027
Contract Work −0.060 0.042
Diversified Activities 0.136*** 0.049
Female Owner −0.114*** 0.027
Illiterate (base category)
Primary Edu 0.040 0.032
Secondary Edu 0.102*** 0.035
Higher Edu 0.211*** 0.049
Central Region (base
category)
Eastern Region −0.001 0.031
Western Region 0.216*** 0.041
Northern Region 0.150*** 0.035
Northeastern Region −0.159*** 0.048
Southern Region 0.256*** 0.041
Industry G1 (base category)
Industry G2 0.043 0.057
Industry G3 −0.231*** 0.038
Indusrty G1 * Contract Work
(base category)
Indusrty G2 * Contract Work 0.117* 0.067
Indusrty G3 * Contract Work 0.084 0.073
Constant 0.617*** 0.102
Selection: Credit Demand
Wage Workers 0.136*** 0.045
Industry G1 (base category)
Industry G2 −0.035 0.061
Industry G3 0.334*** 0.032
Constant −0.186*** 0.023
Athrho −1.968*** 0.230
Rho −0.962
Wald test (Rho = 0): Chi2 (1) 73.05
Prob > Chi2 0.000
No. of observations 82,504
Censored observations 38,897
Uncensored observations 43,607
Log pseudolikelihood −12,900,000
Wald Chi2 (21) 320.59
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Source: Authors’ estimates based on NSS dataset.
* Significance at the 10% level.
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continuing investment may face relatively greater constraints.
Small enterprises located in the eastern and northeastern
regions of India are less likely to receive formal credit, whileSignificance at the 5% level.
** Significance at the 1% level.
ndustries (Industry G3) are significantly more likely to have
redit demand, compared to the base category (Industry G1).
In the outcome Eq. (1), which is our main concern, we find
hat constrained enterprises are less likely to receive formal
redit compared to unconstrained enterprises. This is not sur-
rising, given the statistics in Table 2 that demonstrate that the
onstrained enterprises are also the ones that have, on aver-
ge, less educated owners, lower levels of registration with ament Finance 5 (2015) 43–52 49
egulatory authority, more female owners, and more situated in
 less developed region of India, etc.
As we expected, the firm size and registration status have
 significantly positive impact on the probability of receiving
ormal credit. Even within the homogeneous group of small
nterprises, size does matter for access to formal credit. Tur-
ing to other hard information that characterises enterprises,
rst, the ratio of land to fixed assets as a proxy for collateral
as a significantly negative effect on the likelihood of receiv-
ng formal credit. The result is contrary to the earlier finding of
ohli (1997). This may be partly because the authorities request
ommercial banks not to insist on collateral for loans below a
ertain amount. In addition, as mentioned earlier, there may be
 tendency for lenders to discourage investment in small enter-
rises due to the issue of the land administration system with
igh transaction costs of land as collateral. Further, we do not
nd the ratio of value added to fixed assets to be significant. The
oefficient on maintaining an account in written form is positive
s we expected, but statistically insignificant.
Enterprises with diversified activities are more likely to
eceive formal credit. Diversification makes small enterprises
ore resilient to economic downturns, and thus, those who are
ngaged in more diversified activities can be expected to be more
rofitable and creditworthy. This is in line with what has been
bserved in the literature.
Turing to owner related variables, we find that enterprises of
emale owners have a significantly negative impact on the prob-
bility of receiving formal credit. A higher level of the owner’s
ducation is positively significant in determining the probability
f access to formal credit.
Turing to soft information that characterises enterprises,
he coefficient on sub-contracting arrangements is negative,
ut statistically insignificant. The result seems to confirm our
ypothesis that small enterprises working on sub-contract may
nter this arrangement in distress and may not be of the type
nvolving transfer of technology and knowledge from large
nterprises to small enterprises like in East Asian economies.14
owever, if we look at the interaction term between contract
ork and industry group engaged in mineral based industries
Industry G2), the coefficient for the interaction term is found
o be positive and significant at a 10% level. Thus, in general,
hile enterprises working on sub-contract with large enterprises
ay not benefit positively, those working on sub-contract with
nterprises belonging to mineral based industries appear to have
 higher probability of receiving formal credit.
Turning to the industry specific characteristics, enterprises
ngaged in capital intensive industries (Industry G3) are less
ikely to receive formal credit, although they have a strong
emand for credit. This result is consistent with Kumar and
rancisco (2005), that enterprises engaged in capital intensive
ndustries with higher credit needs for initial project scale and14 See Urata and Kawai (2002) in the context of Japan.
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hose located in the northern, western and southern regions are
ore likely to receive it when compared to the central region.
f states in India are categorised into more developed and less
eveloped states, then the more developed states are in the north-
rn, western and southern regions.
.  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate enterprise level factors affecting
ccess to formal credit for small enterprises in India using a large
ata set. We employ a probit with a sample selection model to
ddress the sample selection bias that commonly affects regres-
ion with survey-based data. We find that firm size and firms’
egistration with a formal agency have a significantly positive
mpact on the probability of receiving formal credit. Enterprises
ith higher educated owners and enterprises with diversified
ctivities are more likely to receive formal credit. However,
nterprises of female owners and enterprises engaged in capital
ntensive industries are more likely to face credit constraints.
hese results are in line with the literature on credit constraints
y small enterprises.
However, the ratio of land to fixed assets as a proxy for col-
ateral has a significantly negative effect on the likelihood of
eceiving formal credit. This may be due to the obsolete land
dministration system resulting in high transaction costs of land
s collateral. In addition, the contractual production relation-
hip with large enterprises does not necessarily affect small
nterprises’ ability to receive formal credit, unless such con-
ractual relationship is in the mineral based industry. This may
uggest that, on average, in the case of small enterprises in India,
he technological and organisational spillovers due to subcon-
racting relationship with larger enterprises is limited, unlike the
xperience of small and medium enterprises in Japan.
Taking our results together, we conclude that more formal and
ransparent firms, larger firms, firms with educated owners and
hose with diversified activities tend to have a better chance of
eceiving formal credit. The factors that hinder small enterprises’
ccess to formal credit are uselessness of land as collateral for
oans, less-educated owners, female owners and being located in
he northeastern region. To remove these constraints, it may be
ecessary to take corrective interventions regarding land admin-
stration system, promotion of education, financial inclusion for
omen entrepreneurs and developing underdeveloped regions
uch as the northeastern region of India. In the absence of such
emand side interventions, supply side credit policies may not
y themselves translate into an enhanced supply of credit for
mall enterprises in India.
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ppendix.
able A1
escription of variables.
ariable name Description and definition
ependent variables
ormal Credit This variable takes a value 1 if an enterprise
reported that they received formal credit over the
reference period, otherwise 0. Formal credit
includes credit from commercial banks and
co-operative banks, development financial
institutions and other government agencies
redit Demand This variable takes a value 1 either for enterprises
that received credit from formal or informal sources
or those that reported that they were short of finance
capital, otherwise 0
ndependent variables
onstrained This variable takes a value 1 if an enterprise within
small enterprises with credit demand reported that
they were short of capital as one of the problems,
otherwise 0
og Workers Natural log of the number of workers. This is a
proxy for the size of a firm
and Fixed
Assets Ratio
The value of owned land is used as a proxy variable
for collateral. To control the effect of size, the value
is divided by the value of total fixed assets
alue Added
Fixed
Assets Ratio
This is the ratio of the value added to total fixed
assets. This is an indicator of efficient use of capital
egistration Status This takes a value of 1 if an enterprise is registered
under any one of these and 0 otherwise: (i) District
Industries Centres (DICs), (ii) Khadi and Village
Industries Commission (KVIC), (iii) Development
Commissioner (handicrafts), (iv) Development
Commissioner (handlooms), (v) Coir Board, (vi)
Silk Board, (vii) Jute Commissioner, (viii)
Municipal Corporation, Panchayat or any other local
body, (ix) Section 85 of the Factories Act, or (x) any
other body
ccount This variable takes a value 1 if an enterprise
maintained an account in written form, otherwise 0
ontract Work This is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if an
enterprise has undertaken any work on contract and
0 otherwise
iversified Activities This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if an
enterprise engaged in mixed (diversified) activities
and 0 otherwise
emale Owner This takes a value of 1 if an enterprise had a female
owner, otherwise 0
wner’s education dummies
lliterate This takes a value 1 if an owner of enterprise had no
education and was not literate, otherwise 0
rimary Edu This takes a value 1 if an owner of enterprise had
primary school education or less, otherwise 0
econdary Edu This takes a value 1 if an owner of enterprise hadsecondary school education, otherwise 0
igher Edu This takes a value 1 if an owner of enterprise had
higher education including technical education,
otherwise 0
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able A1 (Continued)
ariable name Description and definition
ocation dummies a
entral Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar
Pradesh, and Uttarakhand, otherwise 0
orthern Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Punjab, Haryana, Chandigarh, Delhi,
Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu &
Kashmir, otherwise 0
astern Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Sikkim,
Andaman & Nicobar, and Odisha, otherwise 0
estern Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, Daman and
Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, otherwise 0
outhern Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu,
Puducherry, Andhra Pradesh, and Lakshadweep,
otherwise 0
ortheastern Region It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was located in the
states of Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura,
otherwise 0
ndustry dummies b
ndustry G1 This takes a value 1 if an enterprise belonged to NIC
(2004) codes 15–21 including 01405 primarily –
indicating agri-based industries, otherwise 0
ndustry G2 This takes a value 1 if an enterprise belonged to NIC
(2004) codes 22–27 primarily – indicating
mineral-based industries, otherwise 0
ndustry G3 This takes a value 1 if an enterprise belonged to NIC
(2004) codes 28–37 primarily – indicating more
capital intensive industries, otherwise 0
ndusrty G1 *
Contract work
Interaction term between Industry G1 and
Contract Work
ndusrty G2 *
Contract work
Interaction term between Industry G2 and
Contract Work
ndusrty G3 *
Contract work
Interaction term between Industry G3 and
Contract Work
age Workers It takes a value 1 if an enterprise was hiring workers
other than family member, otherwise 0
a The classification of the regions is based on that of RBI.b Industry G1
ncludes manufacture of food products and beverages, tobacco products, tex-
iles, wearing apparel, tanning and dressing of leather, leather goods, footwear,
ood and products of wood, articles of straw and plaiting materials and paper
nd paper products. Industry G2 includes publishing, printing and reproduc-
ion of recorded media, manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and
uclear fuel, chemicals and chemical products, rubber and plastics products,
on-metallic mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, furniture
nd recycling. Industry G3 includes manufacture of machinery and equipment,
ffice, accounting and computing machinery, electrical machinery and appa-
atus, radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus, medical,
recision and optical instruments, watches and clocks, motor vehicles, trailers
nd semi-trailers and other transport equipment.
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